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Abstract  
This thesis analyses whether China tries to gain more p wer in the IMF staying within 
the current international U.S.-dominated system. The analysis focuses on China´s 
behavior in the IMF during the reform process of the last decade. The thesis examines 
the ways in which China can gain more power staying in the IMF. However, current 
power structures make it difficult to implement changes and China might therefore use 
political groups such as the BRICS and their New Development Bank to exert pressure. 
But the intention of the BRICS is not to overthrow the system but to reform it. Using 
official statements and speeches delivered by Chinese, U.S. or IMF staff in the IMF as 
well as articles published in newspapers Chinese claims and US reactions were 
analyzed. The results suggest that China stays within the international system and does 
not try to overthrow it. Nevertheless, pressure is created through the establishment of 
the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank 
(AIIB). The intention of this thesis is to give a current account of Chinese behavior in 
the international community, supporting the understanding of underlying dynamics.      
 
Abstrakt 
Tato diplomová práce se zabývá otázkou, zda se Čína nepokouší získat více moci 
v MMF, přestože MMF je dominován Spojenými státy. Analýza je zaměřena na 
počínání Číny v MMF během reformního procesu posledních deseti let. Autorka 
zkoumá jakým způsobem může Čína získat více vlivu. Stávající struktura komplikuje 
snahu dosáhnout změny. Čína tudíž hodlá použít tzv. BRICS a jejich New Development 
Bank, aby prosadila změny. BRICS nemají zájem svrhnout stávající systém, nýbrž ho 
reformovat. Prostřednictvím oficiálních prohlášení, proslovů  čínských, amerických a 
přímo reprezentantů MMF na půdě MMF i článků v novinách se autorka zaměřuje jak 
na čínská konstatování, tak na americké reakce. Výsledky naznačují, že Čína si přeje 
zůstat v rámci mezinárodního systému, nikoliv ho zničit. Nicméně existují tlaky 
způsobené New Development Bank a Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. Záměr 
této práce je poskytnout aktuální rozbor čínského počínání v mezinárodním společ nství 
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China needs those international organizations in order to act and grow internationally. 
But China´s growth creates fear that it might try to overthrow the current US dominated 
system. In recent years developing countries try to get more votes in international 
organizations and the IMF. The BRICS push for these rights as a group after the 
financial crisis of 2008. 2008 marked a truning point and led to an even stronger China 
relative to US power. The US however, generally controls or dominates international 
institutions such as the IMF. China tried to transform its economic power into political 
power in international institutions especially after 2008. The question is to what extent 
if at all they challenge the US-dominated system.   
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IMF. A comparison before and after 2008 is made. Important highlights of the 
relationship during their long history are taken into account. 
 
The BRICS are analyzed on the ground of whether or not their initial aim was to change 
the system and what their goals are.  The BRICS, an informal institution established 
after the financial crisis, might serve Chinese needs and might create a new power bloc 
   
within the current system. Finally the Development Bank by the BRICS is introduced 
and its power is characterized. 
 
The methodology of the analysis will first be explained and consists of three parts 
(before 2008, before 2010 and after 2010-approx. 2015). I will compare China´s 
achievements alone and by the BRICS together. One asp ct is also to look at China´s 
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or not. The analysis should provide me with the dynamics of recent years so that today´s 
situation can be judged accordingly.  
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Development Bank together with the BRICS.  In this context it is important to see what 
meaning the newly established New Development Bank has which might or might not 
challenge the IMF indirectly. The New Development Bank is usually said to challenge 
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the IMF are surely given. It might be the first step to overthrow the system or to 
pressure the US and Europe to finally give China more p wer within the IMF.  
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1.1 Introduction into the Topic 
 
     China´s rise and its integration into the inter ational community have evoked 
concerns about its intentions especially during the last decade. The global economic 
crisis of 2008 brought a new challenge to the US dominated global political economy 
which was based on the Washington and Post-Washington Consensus.1 China´s 
economic success relative to the US leads to greater powers thereby achieving further 
bargaining power in international institutions such as the IMF. This created fear and 
distrust as to whether China would try to challenge the international order even though 
it is well-integrated into the world community. From its admission to UN in 1971, 
China was gradually integrated into the international system and participated in global 
governance by joining other nations shaping internatio l institutions.2 In the early 
1980s, China added a role in the IMF. China´s integration into the international 
community has already led to more political power and a trend to multipolarity. As 
Chinese economic power is not properly reflected in political power in the IMF, a 
legitimacy problem was created for the IMF. Lacking le itimacy especially apparent in 
the last decade, the IMF tries to implement substantial governance reforms. Reforms 
were agreed on in 2006, 2008 and 2010 respectively. The reforms of 2010 are, however, 
still ineffective because the US Congress has not ratified them. In addition, in recent 
years, perceptions of systematic unfairness increasingly undermined the IMF´s 
legitimacy.3                                                                                                 
     In combination with the legitimacy problem of the IMF, China may intend to 
challenge the IMF and the underlying international system. International institutions, 
however, protect their interests from new actors via conservative procedures.4 Those 
operating procedures are quite visible in the IMF where, in essence, the US enjoys veto 
power. It is necessary to separate China´s dissatisfaction with international norms and 
institutions based on conflicts of interest with the US as to whether China is a status quo 
                                                 
1 Sadik Ünay, “Reality or Mirage?: BRICS and the Making of Multipolarity in the Global Political Economy“, Insight 
Turkey Quarterly Vol. 15, No. 3, (Summer 2013), p. 78, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=10&hid=4112 (accessed 23.03.2015).   
2 Hongsong Liu “ China´s Proposing Behavior in Global Governance: the cases of the WTO Doha Round negotiation 
and G-20 process”, Revista Brasileira Política Internacional Vol. 57, (Special Edition 2014),  pp.121,122, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=13&hid=4112 (accessed 23.03.2015).  
3 David P. Rapkin and Jonathan R. Strand “Reforming the IMF´s Weighted Voting System”, Journal Compilation 
World Economy Vol.29, No.3 March 2006 p.305, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=16&hid=4112 (accessed 28.03.2015).   
4 Alastair Iain Johnston “Is China a status quo power?”, International Security Quarterly Vol.27. No.4 (Spring 2003) 
p.24 http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=19&hid=4112 (accessed 28.03.2015). 
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power or a challenger.5 In order to reflect on this distinction, US opinio is included in 
the analysis. China, even though it hasn´t claimed power explicitly might still aim for it 
which is also why US opinion has to be taken into account. Some scholars are 
convinced of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat theory.6  
     Against this background, it is important to note that theories of international relations 
assume that rising powers challenge the internationl rder.7 The question remains 
whether those theories apply here and, at which point in time, such a challenge would 
begin. Other studies suggest the actual system itself is the decisive factor when 
challenges occur due to a hegemonic existing order.8 Actual war seems unlikely but 
economic and the political overthrow, implied by war is the reason for including this 
theory. Making matters more complicated is the facttha  the definition of status-quo is 
vague.9 The question of status-quo is therefore addressed in the research question.  
 
 
1.2 Research Question and Hypothesis 
     The research question addresses the challenge China poses to the US dominated 
IMF. Is it true that China tries within the international framework dominated by the US 
to gain more power within the IMF? My hypothesis is that China tries to gain more 
power within the existing global financial system. 
 
 
1.3 Current State of Research and Evaluation of Sources 
     Since the BRICS appeared on the scene of the world stage questions around China 
challenging the system had to be asked differently. Questions had to be asked in 
combination with the Chinese and BRICS´ roles in the international community and 
their intentions. Therefore the research field as de cribed is new. However, this research 
field so far has been approached in a similar way by most scholars. Especially the 
BRICS were mostly evaluated based on their willingness and strength to overthrow the 
system or the role they might play in it in general. Jyrki Käkönen asks “BRICS AS A 
                                                 
5 Ibid. p.25. 
6 Ibid p.55. 
7 Jyrki Käkönen.”BRICS as a new power in international relations?”, Geopolitics, History and International Relationa, 
Vol.6 No.2, (2014) p.86 http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=22&hid=4112, (accessed 28.03.2015).  
8 Michael J. Green and Daniel M. Kliman “China´s Hard Power and the Potential for Conflict in Aisa”, SERI 
Quarterly, Vol.4, No.2 (April 2011), p.34, 
http://www.seriworld.org/16/qt_Section_list.html?mncd=0302&dep=2&pub=20110212&year=2011&pubseq=177 
(accessed 03.05.2015).  
9 Johnston, Ibid. p.8.  
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NEW POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?”, Michael A. Glosny “China and 
the BRICs: A Real (but Limited) Partnership in a Unipolar World” or Zhenbo Hou “The 
BRICS and Global Governance Reform: Can the BRICS provide leadership?”. The 
questions asked by Chinese or Western scholars were similar as well. Another question 
often raised was China´s ability to establish a multilateral system. In Mingjiang Li´s 
“Rising from within: China´s search for a multilateral world and its implications for US-
Chinese Relations” or Robert H. Wade´s: Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity 
to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank and the IMF” the authors consider 
China´s behavior in international organizations andtry to claim that we have or haven´t 
yet reached a state of multilateralism. The problem is that the focus is not on one 
organization specifically. Neither do these authors give an account of the last years and 
China´s behavior in detail. Few papers deal with China and the BRICS in a specific 
organization. Therefore this thesis seeks to deal with a topic which has not yet been 
touched.   
     In doing so, scholarly reviewed articles published in international academic journals 
ensure the quality and accuracy of the information. Most information used in books had 
been previously published as primary sources in academic journals. One of the few 
books cited was published in September 2014 by Palgrave Macmillan and contains a 
detailed analysis of the BRICS by Rich Marino.  The book is new and Palgrave 
Macmillan known for its excellent publications. In order to provide for a sufficient 
variety of knowledgeable views on the topic, articles cited were published by US or 
Chinese authors whenever possible.  
     However, citing Brazilian and Turkish journals was inevitable as the research field is 
contemporary. Both are developing countries. In addition, Brazil is a member of the 
BRICS. Turkey on the other hand benefitted from Chinese insistence on reforms in the 
IMF. It was among the countries to be chosen for the first ad hoc Quota increase in 
2006. Therefore scholars in both countries might have  special research interest 
because their countries are affected to a great extent by China.  
     All the papers used were peer reviewed. Approaching this topic from a Chinese 
perspective is essential to a great extent although the quality of the journals might be 
less. The arguments presented by the authors increased the quality of this work.  
Published during the time frame, 2005-2015, the sources e.g. speeches, newspapers, 
articles used were taken from renowned magazines. The official webpage of the IMF is 
also an important source. Attempting to use primary sources whenever possible the 
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intention was to elevate the quality of this thesis. Most of the sources used were 
published after 2008. To highlight China´s behavior, g als and relations with the outside 
world in the 1950s publications cited include academic papers written shortly 
afterwards as well as recent ones. The intent is toprovide a concise picture, less biased 
by the Cold War.  
     Important for the analysis overall was the analysis by Alastair Iain Johnston from 
Harvard University who accounted for China´s behavior with the outside world, by 
asking the question whether or not China is a statu-quo power in 2003. His ideas are 
useful when referring to the earlier era.   
     Michael Oksenberg was a member of the National Security Council under President 
Jimmy Carter and involved in the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the 
US and China. He discusses China´s rise in the context of its participation in 
international organizations. Secondary sources are ess ntial to support this analysis. A 
scholarly article which interviewed IMF staff about the decision making process in 2010 
provides essential information.  
     Interviews with Joseph Stiglitz, awarded the Nobel Prize in economics in 2001, 
evaluate the establishment of the Development Bank. He had served as the vice 
president and chief economist of the World Bank. In addition he has great knowledge of 
the IMF. The interview referred to was cited several times in the news media. Joseph 
Stiglitz is especially respected for his critique on operations and governance of the IMF 
and The World Bank.  
     Speeches of President Obama and official publications by U.S. Congress evaluate the 
legitimacy of Chinese claims. US´ intentions and behavior are included as well as a 
close look at the most recent development when evaluating the BRICS´. The New 
Development Bank, based on the latest publications, captures the most recent 
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1.4 Theoretical Background of the Thesis Question 
     The theoretical background of this thesis is therefore political economy. The research 
field of Political Economy can be divided into three parts, Economic Liberalism, 
Economic Nationalism and Economic Structuralism. Economic Liberalism neo-liberal 
ideas were promoted by the IMF in the 1980s and 1990s. Classical liberalism traces 
back to Adam Smith. Economic Liberalism which stands in contrast to Economic 
Nationalism promotes liberal economic policies such as free trade. Economic 
Nationalists like Alexander Hamilton claimed that liberal policies only served the 
industrialized states and not developing countries.10 Economic Nationalism deals with 
the economic competition of states and thus provides an explicitly political analysis. 
One part of the mercantilist writing is the zero-sum game which means that when one 
party wins another party loses. Even though the applicability is limited, concerning the 
IMF and the Quota based system this theory is useful. When China gains more power, 
has a higher share of Quota another country would have to give a part of his share.  
Economic Structuralism highlights the need to take into account structural features in an 
economic analysis and includes institutional factors when analyzing economic 
problems. The actors and their relations are taken into account in the analysis.  
     The approach therefore combines these elements and the methodology is similar to 
the methodology of research already conducted. Regarding China as a state actor as well 
as in a group of the BRICS the increasing importance of globalization is taken into 
account. Two factors globalization takes into account is the growing inequality in e.g. 
distribution of wealth and the loss of national autonomy due to international 
organizations. This fact makes the claims by China o  reforms of the IMF all the more 
important and need to be looked at closely. Economic Nationalism includes the political 
aspect of my analysis which in this case is a zero-sum game. Therefore China and the 
US have to be looked at more closely because what Cina gains can be said is almost 
equivalent to what the US or at least the West loses. Economic Structuralism has to be 
taken into account in the IMF and the way in which the power is divided or reforms are 




                                                 
10R. Falkner „International Political Economy“, 2011, p.22, 
http://www.londoninternational.ac.uk/sites/default/files/programme_resources/lse/lse_pdf/subject_guides/ir3026_ch1-
3.pdf, (accessed 11.05.2015). 




     The analysis considers a time frame of ten years, 2005-2015. The last decade in the 
IMF was characterized by important governance reforms and influenced China´s current 
behavior to a great extent. Therefore, the analysis ooks at IMF reforms in detail and the 
dynamics underlying them. Against these reforms Chinese and since 2009 the BRICS 
claims are analyzed. The legitimacy of those claims is further assured by looking at US 
and IMF statements. In particular articles, journals nd speeches, are analyzed seeking 
to know what actual intentions are and to compare them to actions and outcomes. China 
might pursue its claims with the help of the BRICS. As already mentioned, the BRICS 
were usually treated as individual countries rather t an as a group, but the group is 
included in this analysis. The BRICS´ reports are analyzed. The BRICS are important to 
consider because they represent a new power group in the economic and political 
framework which is still dominated by the US. They use their bargaining power as a 
group to advance their common aims. In order to find suitable material, publications of 
the years specified by China, the BRICS, the US Congress and the IMF are analyzed. 
Mostly primary sources are published online; including articles from renowned US or 
international magazines and the media e.g. the Washington Post. These include 





1.6 The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured chronologically first dealing with Chinese history and the 
history of governance of the IMF. For a long time China had lived in isolation, ignoring 
the outside world. China regarded itself as superior to others and was highly developed. 
This might be the reason for relations not on a level playing field with neighboring 
states or other countries. Nevertheless, the focus f China´s history is on the era of Mao 
and Deng Xiaoping. Mao was a revolutionary challenger to the international system 
whereas the role of Deng Xiaoping was very different. An ambivalent picture of China 
emerges depending on the leader and time. It is thu necessary to look closely at the 
specific time to be able to make judgments about China´s behavior. In order to be able 
to reach appropriate judgments about the IMF, its history has to be taken into account as 
well. IMF history is marked by few changes in governance except in the General Quota 
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Reviews. Thus, there is no history of reforms and experience of the IMF. The power 
structure is a constant and defines the ways in which China gained more power in the 
IMF. The power structure of the IMF should show that China is able to gain more 
power by staying within the international system. Increasing the Quota is the only 
significant means to gain more power in the IMF because of the importance the Quota 
has for a country´s relationship to the IMF.  
     The subsequent chapter defines ways in which China has acted in the IMF and its 
process of integrating into the international community which impacts China´s behavior 
in the IMF today. China integrated well into the international community and the IMF. 
The history of China and the IMF is a history of cooperation. On the one hand, China 
tries to avoid IMF interference in its domestic affairs. The IMF, on the other hand, has 
not enough leverage to make its members or China act in certain ways. This may have 
implications for today. 
     BRICS is a very recent phenomenon which has to be taken into account when 
dealing with current Chinese intentions, hence the New Development Bank is to be 
introduced shortly. The BRICS recently entered the world stage. The new economic and 
political group tries to gain decision-making power in international institutions as a 
group. Despite their differences, they work together, usually on non-binding, 
intergovernmental bases. China, the most influential member, enjoys the most power. 
The New Development Bank is presented as the first real project undertaken by the 
BRICS. It complements efforts to address the shortcomings in the international financial 
system but to dates is too small to have a real impact.  
Speeches, newspapers, and scholarly works from the last ten years, they reveal China´s 
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2.1 A Short Introduction into China´s History: Is China a Status Quo Power or a 
Challenger? 
 
     China has not always lived inside the system. Therefore it is important to look at its 
history and the way China behaved to be able to understand and evaluate its behavior 
today. Examining China´s history presents an ever-changing outlook and relationships 
with the outside world. For a long period of time, specifically until the opium trade and 
later the opium wars from 1839-1842 and from 1856-18 0 when the country had to 
open itself to the outside world, China lived in isolation ignoring the outside world. This 
is basically due to the world view termed “Middle Kingdom” which says that China is 
the centre of the world, and then there are tributary states and barbarians. Tributary 
states are the neighboring countries which need to give tributes to China. Barbarians are 
everyone else. While Confucianism was the philosophy under which China was ruled, it 
never defined China´s relationship with the outside world. China considered itself self-
sufficient and didn´t rely on any foreign country which may have made it feel superior. 
The voyages of Zheng He are unique during the Ming Dynasty. To this day scholars can 
only guess about their purpose.11 China thus had few relations with the outside world 
and was not very interested in discovering it. Confucianism, a philosophical system, 
determined relationships e.g. father vs. son, to ensure harmony and determined China´s 
outlook on the world.    
     China was a highly developed country with many inventions like gun powder which 
might have contributed to the feeling of superiority. Being highly developed itself China 
might have seen no benefits in relations with foreign rs. In 1796 the Macartney mission, 
the first diplomatic contact between GB and China, failed because the Emperor 
regarded the tributes as toys.12  Furthermore regarding itself as superior China didn´t 
have relations on a level playing field. It thus did not challenge the system but it also 
didn´t participate in it. On the other hand the impact of China´s treatment by foreigners 
in the following century of humiliation (1839-1949) should not be underestimated. The 
century of humiliation is the period from the first opium war onwards. China was other-
directed and forced to open ports and trade. In addition, it was the barbarians who 
                                                 
11 Robert Finlay “The Voyages of Zheng He: Ideology, State Power and Maritime Trade in Ming China”, The 
Historical Society and Wiley Periodicals, Inc., (September 2008) pp.329, 330, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=26&hid=4112 (accessed 11.05.2015). 
12 John L. Cranmer-Byng and Trevor H. Levere “A Case Study in Cultural Collision: Scientific Apparatus in the 
Macartney Embassy to China 1793”, Annals of Science (September 1981), p.503, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=29&hid=4112 (accessed 11.05.2015). 
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invaded China and forced it to establish ports and start trade relations with the west.13 
This fact certainly added to the feeling of humiliat on. Suspicion on the side of the 
Chinese as to the intentions of foreigners in their country might have been the result of 
that time. After these experiences China may try everything it can to prevent foreign 
interference in domestic affairs.  
     But China also presented itself as a challenger to international order. During Mao´s 
rule, the PRC can be primarily characterized as a revolutionary challenger of the 
international system, one which considered force to be a viable tool to achieve this 
aim.14 Mao felt obligated to the idea of fundamental change of the international order, 
and the world revolution, for his entire life.15 Even though he might have had a world 
revolution always in mind, his foreign policy changed over time. However, the use of 
force in the 1950s especially might already signal a certain eagerness for change by 
Mao. Mao wanted to implement communism in China andwas looking forward to a 
world revolution led by China.16 This aforementioned attitude shows that China 
challenged the world system but also claimed a central position for itself. China wanted 
to liberate the world from the imperialistic West, fought the US e.g. in Korea, and 
attacked the offshore islands of Taiwan.17 China thus used force outside its territory and 
acted according to revolutionary principles. Although the US had crossed the 38th 
parallel, bringing China into the war, China defendd communism and “the brethren” in 
the North. Nevertheless, despite revolutionary ideals, Mao´s China took integrationist 
steps abroad to be able to concentrate on domestic concerns.18 These priorities show that 
domestic outcomes are the primary concern as, despite the fact that the party is 
authoritarian, it needs legitimacy. That means under Mao already China´s foreign policy 
was linked to domestic politics. The years 1955 and1956 marked a turning point in 
                                                 
13 Alison Adcock Kaufman “The ´Century of Humiliation,´ Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the Internaio l 
Order”, Pacific Focus, Vol.25, No.1 (April 2010) p.5, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=36&hid=4112 (accessed 11.03.2015). 
14 Xiaoting Li.”The Taming of the Red Dragon: The Militarized Worldview and China´s use of Force, 1949-2001”, 
Foreign Policy Analysis Quarterly, Vol.9, No.4 (October 2013), p.387, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=39&hid=4112 (accessed 01.04.2015). 
15 Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente: Mao´s changing Psyche and Policy 
toward the United States, 1969-1976”, The Journal of the Society For Historians of American Foreign Relations: 
Diplomatic History Vol.34 No.2 five times a year (April 2010) p.397, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=42&hid=4112 (accessed 01.04.2015).  
16 Li, Ibid. pp.341-344. 
17 Li, Ibid. p.389. 
18 Ibid. p.393. 
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China´s policy. Peaceful co-existence19 became the principle under which relations with 
the US should improve; World peace was promoted rathe  than a world revolution.20 
Some critics suggest a different interpretation. They say that China wanted to behave 
normal in a way to create a united front of Asian countries against the US.21 Again, real 
intentions are difficult to know. But China focused on the expansion of Peaceful 
Coexistence and opposed hegemony. Peaceful Coexistence was expanded by the “Three 
Worlds Theory” which focused on principles of national unity and self-determination of 
the backward countries, opposed imperialism and hegemony, and was intended as a 
means for China to gain international legitimacy.22 It seems that Mao, while promoting 
a world revolution, wasn´t concerned about foreign assessment of him, his Government, 
by the 1950s, he wanted to be recognized. China needed to find its place in the 
international community. The example shows the contradictions in Chinese foreign 
policy and how difficult it can be to know what goals China pursues. 
     Disputes with Moscow in the beginning of 1960 led to a break between the two 
communist camps because Beijing sought to be the leader of world communism.23 
China´s attitude changed depending on its allies and treatment by foreign powers, 
developing radical and violent foreign relations approaches. In the mid-1960s China 
even prepared for a nuclear war.24 These preparations for war made 1960 the most 
dangerous time of Chinese relations with the outside world. Altered within a few weeks 
or months, Chinese behavior outside the internationl rder changed quickly during 
Mao´s rule. But even after joining the UN in 1971 and Nixon´s visit to China in 1972, 
Mao didn´t trust the outside world and the US in particular.25 The visit however gave 
China new recognition and shows that integration into the international community 
alone is insufficient to create trust in the international system. The system needs to 
prove its legitimacy. But Mao´s interest may only have been the accumulation of power.  
                                                 
19 The five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence adopted by Zhou Enlai in 1954 are: 1) mutual respect for each other´s 
territorial integrity and sovereignity; 2) non-aggression; 3) non-interference in each other´s internal aff irs; 4) equality 
and mutual benefit and 5) Peaceful Coexistence   
20 Li, Ibid. p.394.  
21 Shu Guang Zhang “Constructing ´Peaceful Coexistence´: China´s Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung 
Conferences, 1954-55”, Cold War History Quarterly, Vol.7, No.4 (November 2007), p.509, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=45&hid=4112 (accessed 11.05.2015). 
22 Jiang An ”Mao Zedong´s “Three Worlds” Theory: Political Considerations and Value for the Times”, Social 
Sciences in China Quarterly, Vol.34, No.1, (February 2013), pp. 55, 48,49, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=48&hid=4112 (accessed 10.05.2015).  
23 Li, Xiaoting.”The Taming of the Red Dragon: The Militarized Worldview and China´s use of Force, 1949-2001”, 
Foreign Policy Analysis Vol.9 (2013), p.394; Michael M. Sheng “Mao and China´s relations with the Superpowers in 
the 1950s: A New Look at the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Sino-Soviet Split”, Modern China Vol.34, No.4, (October 
2008), p.477, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27746900?seq=9#page_scan_tab_contents (accessed 12.05.2015). 
24 Yang and Xia, Ibid.  p.399. 
25Li, Ibid. p.395. 
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     Deng Xiaoping embraced a very different foreign policy. China adopted a Lockean, 
non-militarized worldview and was integrated furthe into the international 
community.26 China joined the WTO in 2001. In order to integrate into the international 
community China had to accept status quo standards, that is international norms. Until 
1999, China had proposed few new rules in internatio l organizations and conformed 
to international norms in part because it benefitted from them.27 Joining the WTO 
showed that China had adopted the principal of freet ade generally shared by the 
international community.28 Chinese gradual integration into the international 
community required about 50 years before becoming a member of all important 
international organizations. 
     Mao´s successor had a very different agenda. He was different in character, too. 
Deng Xiaoping opened China to the outside world and was optimistic about the future 
development of China within the system. He regarded China´s involvement in the 
international community as a chance for development.29 This opinion reflects a belief of 
mutual dependence between China and other states. This dependence, especially on the 
US, increased after the Cold War ended.30 But even after the Tiananmen crisis and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, he did not regard the C inese situation as bad.31 “Shelving 
disagreement and joint development” was Deng Xiaoping´s motto which according to 
some scholars had a huge impact on Chinese foreign policies for several years.32 Deng 
used the five principals of peaceful coexistence in the 1980s and especially after the 
Tiananmen crisis.33 Thus he advocated participation within the current international 
system and was opposed to changing it or to living in isolation. Chinese participation 
within the international community became furthermoe indispensable due to its 
economic success.  
     In the 1990s Chinese leaders realized that their legitimacy depends on economic 
growth which in turn is guaranteed by the integration into the international 
community.34 Or as the former Chinese Foreign Minister from 1988-1998 Qian Qichen 
                                                 
26 Ibid. p.388. 
27 Johnston, Ibid. p.23.  
28 Ibid. p.15.  
29 Li, Ibid. pp.395, 396.  
30 Johnston, Ibid. pp.45,46. 
31 Deng Xiaoping “Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping)”, Vol.3 Beijing (1993) Renmin 
Chubanshe, p.354 in Li, Xiaoting.”The Taming of theR d Dragon: The Militarized Worldview and China´s use of 
Force, 1949-2001”, Foreign Policy Analysis Vol.9 (2013), p.396   
32 Li, Ibid. p.396.  
33 Michael Yahuda “Deng Xiaoping: The Statesman”, The China Quarterly, No.135, (September 1993), p.556, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/654102?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (accessed 01.04.2015). 
34 Johnston, Ibid. pp.16,17. 
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put it “foreign policy is the extension of China´s domestic politics”.35 Foreign politics 
thus became of paramount importance for economic success and party survival. 
Tensions between China and the US increased in the 1990s. Presenting China as a 
challenger to the international system not complying with human rights, international 
norms, the Tiananmen crisis and the 1990s marked th beginning of debates in the US 
about whether or not China was a status quo power or a revisionist state.36 The reason 
for these debates might be the massacre and that China considers human rights as US 
interference with its domestic affairs. The massacre fu thermore led to a decline in US-
Chinese relations. In the 1990s Chinese leaders didn´t trust the US government which 
pursued a “soft containment strategy” on China.37 
     Important to consider is that trade modified China´s behavior towards other 
countries. Like other aspects such as territorial disputes the amount of trade that flows 
between China and other countries, can have an impact on its behavior especially when 
threatened by instability. 38 It is furthermore important to understand how a country 
regards its future. China doesn´t have a lot in comm n with other challenger states such 
as the Soviet Union in the 1940s.39 An exception of all this is Taiwan. Concerning 
Taiwan, the one-China policy and one-China principle have marked China´s foreign 
relations and this won´t change since Chinese identity is involved. One-China is a 
concept promoted by China. It means that Taiwan is a part of China and thus a part of 
Chinese identity. It therefore cannot become independent. This in turn influences 
Chinese relations with the outside world to a great extent. 
     The aforementioned examples show an ambiguous picture of China and its 
worldview. China is not a status quo power neither a challenger to the international 
system per se. Depending on whether it fears the outside world as Mao did or sees 
benefits in joining the community it adopts different agendas. Those views depend 
strongly on the personality of the leader. Again the example of Taiwan shows that when 
Chinese identity is involved e.g. Taiwan´s independence is not an option. The same is 
visible with China´s attitude on Hong Kong.   
 
                                                 
35 Qichen, Qian “Qian Qichen on the world situation’, Beijing Review, Vol.33, No.3, (1990), pp. 16–18 in Qingmin 
Zhang “Towards an Integrated Theory of Chinese Foreign Policy: bringing leadership personality back in”, Journal of 
Contemporary China, Vol.23, No.89, (2014), p.902 , 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2014.882566#.VVzEXrntmkon (accessed 02.04.2015). 
36 Johnston, Ibid. pp.5-8, 20. 
37 Ibid. p.53. 
38 Li, Ibid. p.401.  
39 Robert B. Zoellick “Whither China from membership to responsibility?”,  Remarks to National Committee on US-
Chinese Relations, September 21, 2005, p.2 
http://www.ncuscr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf, (accessed 30.03.2015). 
   
13 
 
2.2 The IMF History  
     Before taking a look at China´s relationship with the IMF and the way in which 
China may gain power within the international system, a brief account of the history of 
the IMF is needed. Established by thirty-five countries in 1945, the IMF ensures the 
daily functioning of the international financial system by for instance helping countries 
in financial distress. 
 
“The IMF works to foster global growth and economic stability. 
It provides policy advice and financing to members in economic 
difficulties and also works with developing nations to help them 
achieve macroeconomic stability and reduce poverty.” 40 
 
     For sixty-five years, the IMF held a central role in the international financial 
architecture.41 This important role may explain why China among other countries has an 
interest in gaining more power in the IMF. The IMF has a long history, is well-
established and will probably make path-breaking decisions in the years to come. Today 
the IMF has 188 members.   
     From 1945 to the present day the role of the IMF changed depending on the time and 
challenges it faced. Crucial in this sense were the many crises the institution had to 
tackle.42 Several crises were the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s and the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997/8. A crucial year which brought a lot of changes was 1971 which 
ended the Bretton Woods system and the Gold Standard. After the Second World War 
the Bretton Woods System was established and determin d financial and commercial 
rules and relations thereafter. The characteristics of the Bretton Woods System were 
fixed exchange rates and the US Dollar as a reserve curr ncy. The IMF was one of the 
institutions implemented to ensure the Bretton Woods smooth implementation and 
operations in monetary management. The IMF´s important coordinating role was 
reduced after the Bretton Woods system ended. Also, the rules countries had to adhere 
to became less strict. At the same time the end of the Bretton Woods system showed 
that the US was prepared to leave the system in 1971 and thus change the entire 
financial system once they didn´t benefit any longer.  
                                                 
40 “Overview”, http://www.imf.org/external/about/overview.htm (accessed 10.03.2015).  
41 “What we do”, http://www.imf.org/external/about/whatwedo.htm (accessed 10.03.2015). 
42 André Broome “The International Monetary Fund, crisis management and credit crunch”, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.64, No.1, (February 2010), pp.37-54, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=55&hid=4112 (accessed 10.03.2015). 
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     The crisis of 2008 might also contribute to a ch nging role of the IMF which could 
either result in an expansion or a reduction of IMF responsibilities. Until the financial 
crisis of 2008, the IMF was not called upon by its members who chose other forums but 
this altered with the crisis.43   
     Considering reforms, the IMF did regular Quota reviews without significant changes 
overall. In 1969 the SDRs went into effect. The SDR is equivalent to an international 
currency; the basket includes the U.S. Dollar, the Japanese yen, the British pound 
sterling and the euro. IMF members can borrow from it based on their Quota. In 1997 
the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) were approved by the Executive Board. In 
general the IMF made adaptations to its daily operations but maintained its governance 
structure making only small arrangements in the General Quota Reviews.44 
     During the Asian financial crisis the IMF failed to help Asian countries adequately 
but, to the contrary, its actions made matters worse.45 This might have led to a feeling 
that the IMF is incapable of dealing with international crises and calls for reforms after 
the crisis.46 The IMF thus had to prove its legitimacy throughout its history by providing 
successful assistance to its members. It did so by adapting its operating procedures and 
the relationship with its member countries, but not through reforms in governance. The 
IMF history shows that the institution learned and changed when confronted with 
certain challenges but has never been future-oriented or planned for change.47 This 
means that until and unless pressure is created by its members, no changes will occur. 
     Since the global financial crisis however, the IMF suffers all the more from a 
capacity i.e. funds availability and legitimacy, the allocation of quota problem. Further 
reforms are necessary. In general, individual member states impact reforms to a great 
extent because reforms are financed by member states bu  drafting such changes is left 
to IMF staff.48 Thus reform success depends on each member state. 
     The history of IMF governance can thus be characterized by stability and continuity. 
The institution hasn´t experienced fundamental changes before the first reforms of 2006. 
Change will probably only take place once enough pressure is generated by its 
members.  
                                                 
43 Ibid. pp.37,38. 
44 “IMF Chronology”, https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/chron/chron.asp (accessed 02.05.2015). 
45 Broome, Ibid.p.44. 
46 Neil Dias Karunaratne “The  Asian miracle and crisis”, Intereconomics Vol.34, No.1, (January/February 1999) p.25, 
www.intereconomics.eu/downloads/getfile.php?id (accessed 03.05.2015).  
47 Graham Bird “The IMF: A Bird´s Eye View of Its Role and Operations”, Journal of Economic Surveys Vol.21, No.4, 
(September 2007), p.687, http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=61&hid=4112 (accessed 10.04.2015).  
48 Dries Lesage et al.”IMF reform after the crisis”, International Politics Vol.50, No.4, (July 2013), pp.554–556, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1364541800?accountid=15618 (accessed 10.04.2015). 
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2.3 The IMF Power Structure 
     The ability of members to exert pressure for change depends to a great degree on the 
power structure of the IMF. Therefore the power structure needs to be analyzed to show 
where members have to interfere when interested in gai ing power within the system. 
Most important is the Quota which is assigned to each country is a decisive instrument. 
The Quota is assigned when a country enters the IMF and reflects the country´s relative 
size in the world economy.49 The Quota defines the voting power of the country within 
the IMF, its access to financing, its maximum financi l contribution, SDR allocations 
and thus determines the entire relationship between th  member and the IMF.50 The 
Quota thus determines each country´s strength within the system of the IMF. The IMF, 
in order to remain credible and legitimate, has to adapt the Quota and respect countries´ 
voices for changes.   
     The votes are comprised of basic votes and additional votes for each 100.000 SDR of 
quota.51 Since the 2008 reforms, the basic votes are fixed at 5.502% of the total votes.52 
This would imply that relative weights for countries, with small weights would increase 
and be reduced when the relative weight in the economy is large. One can thus observe 
shifts taking place after the 2008 reform already.  
     Depending on the importance and kind of a decision the percentage of approval 
needed by members is set. The approval of loans, policy decisions and other matters can 
be decided by a simple majority vote by the Executive Board or Board of Governors. 
Major decisions need a supermajority vote of 70% or 85%. Financial and operational 
issues require a 70% supermajority vote (e.g. interes  rates on IMF loans) whereas 85% 
is required for the most important decisions such as Quota increase or the admission of 
new members.53 Quota reviews by the Board of Governors take place every five years 
and any changes have to be approved by 85% of the to al votes.54 This means that 
changes are taking place on a regular basis. The US has a veto power over every quota 
change because its voice is greater than 15%. The US can thus exert political pressure 
on members as no other single member can. It can use the veto power to push a country 
to US favored policies. 
                                                 
49 “Membership”, http://www.imf.org/external/about/mebers.htm (accessed 10.03.2015). 
50 Ibid. 
51 “IMF Quotas”, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm (accessed 10.03.2015). 
52 Ibid.   
53 Martin A. Weiss “International Monetary Fund: Background and Issues for Congress”, July 17, 2014, p.7, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42019.pdf (accessed 30.04.2015). 
54 “IMF Quotas”, Ibid. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm.  
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     The Board of Governors, which meets once a year, is the highest decision-making 
body in the IMF and “consists of one governor and alternate governor for each member 
country”.55 This first of all means that every member participates in every decision 
made. However, differences are obvious when it comes to the Quota which weights the 
voices countries have. This means that strong countries have a decisive advantage as 
they have to agree to loss of votes and the gain of others.  
Current reforms, however, are said to benefit emerging economies. While the Board of 
Governors has delegated many of its powers to the Executive Board, the most important 
such as i.e., 
 
“the right to approve quota increases, special drawing right 
(SDR) allocations, the admittance of new members, compulsory 
withdrawal of members, and amendments to the Articles of 




     Of the 24 members in the Executive Board, five are elected by member countries 
with the largest quotas, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United 
Kingdom together holding 40% voting power, and the rest are elected by the remaining 
member countries. However, current reforms will result in all 24 being elected by all 
members. Decisions by the Executive Board also reflect the quota assigned to member 
countries. The most powerful countries in the IMF thus benefit twice, when choosing 
the members of the Executive Board and when decisions are made. The IMF Managing 
Director is appointed by the Executive Board for a five-year term and is the chairman of 
the executive board and Head of IMF staff.56 The IMF Managing Director has always 
been a European. The procedure of appointing the Managing Director is controversial, 
too. 
It doesn´t reflect members. The IMF´s own legitimacy however is dependent on its 
reflecting a country´s position in the world economy via its contributions to the IMF. 
Otherwise the IMF would lack funds to act in times of crisis and a legitimacy crisis 
result. On the other hand, a country which tries to gain a higher quota not to reflect its 
economic weight doesn´t try to change the rules but bends them to their own advantage. 
                                                 
55 “IMF Members´ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors”, last update 10.03.2015, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.aspx (accessed 10.03.2015). 
56“How the IMF Makes Decisions”, last update 30.09.2014, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/govern.htm 
(accessed 10.03.2015). 
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Still, bending rules is illegitimate. Therefore Chinese actions have to be judged based on 
the possibilities of acting within the system when trying to gain more power. The 
structure shows that the implementation of changes is time-consuming. In order for 
China to gain more say in the IMF there is only onemeans, to increase its quota, and its 





2.4 China and the IMF 
     The way China will try to do that may depend on its relation with the IMF and its 
experience within the IMF over time. China´s positin n the IMF and the development 
of IMF-Chinese relations are thus crucial to understand to be able to put the results of 
the analysis into context. Due to the specificity of the topic only a few sources were 
available. Thus in this chapter these sources will be summarized and analyzed.57 
     China´s first contact with the IMF was very early in the institution´s history. China, 
one of the founding members, joined the IMF on Decemb r 27 1945. In 1980 the 
People´s Republic of China (PRC) took over the respon ibility for China´s relations 
with the IMF and the initial quota for China was set. Before 1980, up until the early 
1970s the IMF was regarded by China as a capitalist instrument whose only purpose 
was to exploit its members. China approached the IMF in a hostile way. Taking over 
responsibility in the 1980s therefore means to end the hostile approach, to actually 
participate in the IMF and to accept the Fund´s rules. China´s quota increased the same 
year and again in 1983 to 2.39billion SDR becoming the ninth largest in the IMF.58 
Being responsive to changes in China´s relative position in the world economy, the IMF 
might have created expectations of future rapid increases. However, financial support in 
the initial stages of Chinese entry onto the international economic scene and its 
economic success was also in Western interests. When China opened its economy 
                                                 
57 Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, China’s participation in the IMF, the World Bank and GATT: toward a 
global economic order (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1990), pp.1-228, 
https://www.press.umich.edu/13227/chinas_participation_in_the_imf_the_world_bank_and_gatt, 
https://books.google.cz/books?id=E7Knn5k0U_8C&printsec=frontcover&hl=de&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#
v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed 20.04.2015). 
Peter Ferdinand and Jue Wang “China and the IMF: from mimicry towards pragmatic international institutional 
pluralism”, International Affairs Vol. 89 No.4 (2013), pp.895–910, 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=365f97df-d428-49e8-9cda-
f826a7fdc974%40sessionmgr4005&vid=66&hid=4112 (accessed 20.04.2015) and “At a Glance- China and the IMF” 
last update 01.09.2004, https://www.imf.org/external/country/chn/rr/glance.htm, (accessed 11.03.2015). 
58 Jacobson and Oksenberg, Ibid. p.76.   
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during the Deng Xiaoping era, it relied on advice by the IMF in order to change its 
financial system, integrate into global finance and create a market oriented financial 
system. This reveals a considerable degree of depennce of China on the IMF due to 
its initial lack of knowledge about the international financial system. Today China is 
well informed about the workings of the international financial system. Due to 
consistent pressure, China´s quota increased gradually over the years. Those increases 
were put in place during regular Quota Reviews and not through reforms. The reform of 
2010 is said to have the largest impact on power shift in the Fund´s history. Four BRICS 
members, minus South Africa, will be among the ten largest shareholders and China 
will become the third largest.  
     Complying with IMF rules, so far (1999) China h s not tried to change decision-
making and proposed just few new rules.59 It follows that China´s relationship with the 
IMF, a US dominated institution, changed especially fter the economic crisis of 2008 
when China´s relative power compared to that of the US increased. This relative power 
shift around 2008 let to optimism for reforms.60 All reforms, however, are locked into 
the initial IMF´s political and economic obligation to represent its members. After 
having been appointed special advisor to the managing d rector in 2010, Zhu Min 
became the first Chinese managing director of the IMF in 2011. This step proved to be 
significant for China´s status in the institution yet should not be overrated. Reforms 
revealed how little impact IMF staff has when it comes to changes in the institution. 
     Still, to be able to have a Chinese managing drector remains an important gesture. 
Albeit promoting diversity of staff for better decision-making via the diversity principle, 
the IMF Chinese staff remains behind its quota. This is not true for the year 2014 
however.61 Published once a year, diversity reports, along with the diversity principle, 
have been implemented for several years. Related to the promotion of employees, the 
report of 2011 shows that Chinese staff is not promoted as a result of its 
underrepresentation in governance. Again, even thoug  IMF staff has limited impact on 
major decisions and changes, its staffing pattern, still reflects the overall Western 
domination within the institution.  
                                                 
59 Johnston, Ibid. p.23.   
60 Lesage et al., Ibid. p.559. 
61 “IMF Diversity Annual Report 2007” https://www.imf.org/external/np/div/2007/index.pdf, p.26, “IMF Diversity 
Annual Report 2009”, https://www.imf.org/external/np div/2009/index.pdf, p.32 “IMF Diversity Annual Report 2011”, 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/div/2011/index.pdf, p.37 “IMF Diversity Annual Report 2014”, 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/div/2014/index.pdf, p.37, (accessed 27.04.2015).  
   
19 
 
     The only time China borrowed money from the IMF was in 1981 which means that 
the IMF cannot guide Chinese actions through financial assistance. 1981 was right after 
China´s quota in the IMF was set and borrowing money can therefore be regarded as the 
first step of adhering to the rules and adopting IMF standards. The example may have 
helped China to understand in what ways it can benefit from its membership. In 2008, 
this relationship reversed and the IMF was dependent on Chinese financial support to 
deal with the crisis.    
     IMF technical assistance focusing on methodological issues about reporting 
standards were always welcomed by Chinese officials since they didn´t interfere with 
Chinese domestic economic policies. This again show China´s fear of domestic 
interference by foreign powers. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intends to stay in 
control. The strict line between domestic and foreign Chinese affairs is again visible in 
the IMF. This differentiation might be the reason fr China not turning to the IMF in a 
crisis. With the members of the mission team going to China for annual consultations 
varying each year, the Fund is unable to develop additional expertise on China.  One 
benefit of Chinese integration into the system is to learn more about its economies and 
preferences. This chance has been missed and is not taken seriously.  
     China, cautious about what the IMF publishes from their consultations, blocked 
publications from 2007-2009. The People´s Bank of China (PBC) is primarily 
responsible for Chinese-IMF relations; the staff dealing with the IMF however is not 
involved in the decision-making of the bank. Again foreign and domestic affairs are 
separated. During the financial crisis of 2008 China helped other countries providing 
money e.g. in the euro zone crisis and thus preventd systemic threats. This shows, if 
necessary, China is prepared to help to stabilize the s atus quo. Following the Mexican 
crisis, the IMF established regional organizations to resist future IMF pressure for 
policy prescriptions. The IMF crisis management however didn´t build confidence in 
the past. Due to the Asian crisis in 1997-8, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was 
established by China in 2000. The CMI is a multilater l currency swap arranged among 
ten ASEAN members including China to be able to manage short-term liquidity 
problems. But, when a certain amount of financial aid has to be withdrawn, the 
threshold increased in recent years, the CMI is tied to the IMF, i.e., funds drawn jointly 
from CMI and IMF thus China cooperated with the IMF.    
     China´s relations with the IMF reveal on the one side Chinese inability to push 
through its aims at certain points and, on the other hand, the IMF is not in control of 
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China. If either of them is unwilling to pursue the other´s demands, there is no way to 
force decisions. Still, in order to preserve the system, China did what it deemed to be 
necessary. China´s relations with the IMF revealed important dynamics between the 





2.5 The BRICS: A Status Quo Challenger? 
     But recently a new group entered the world stage nd may have an impact on the 
international system. The term “BRICs” was coined by Jim O´ Neill in 2001 and was 
first published in a Goldman Sachs report.62 The “BRICS” having been invented by the 
West progressively institutionalized in the last decade e.g. the BRICS Forum and the 
New Development Bank. South Africa joined as a full member in 2011. Today, neither 
politicians nor economists can ignore or overlook this group and their demands easily.63 
Accounting for 40% of the world´s population with teir economies growing at an 
enormous pace, the BRICS, as a group, have enjoyed a positive position in international 
organizations such as the IMF. Thus the BRICS didn´t appear suddenly during the 
global financial crisis. On the contrary, the financial crisis seemed to have given the 
group more significance. One argument why the BRICS cooperate to the extent they do 
today originates in the legitimacy crisis of the inter ational financial order in 2008; trust 
was enhanced due to the cooperation in the beginning and will for this reason most 
likely continue.64 The BRICS are not just a phenomenon about to disappear in the near 
future and must be taken seriously.   
     The common denominator of the BRIC countries from the beginning was to reform 
international institutions and the international financial order.65 Their economies are too 
different to be able to provide the basis for common ground. The reason for the BRICS 
to cooperate thus is found within the international system itself. Other scholars 
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emphasize that the BRICS don´t have a choice other than to reform the international 
system because, dependence on the US is too great and the US may take unfavorable 
measures.66 However, preventive measures might also be taken tryi g to gain more 
power within the current system and therefore the BRICS´ economies might be harmed.  
     The first meeting took place in 2008. The meeting in 2008 in Sao Paolo of the 
BRIC´s finance ministers provided opportunities to protect themselves against the 
global financial crisis, plus adapting global strucures to BRIC´s favor.67 The meeting 
shows that the initial intention was not to change th  global financial system 
completely. Reforms were necessary as the current system didn´t provide for sufficient 
financial resources. One example for the BRIC´s influence after 2008 is the 2009 G-20 
meeting where the BRIC countries set the agenda and influenced the final declaration 
significantly.68 The declaration supported greater regulation, international cooperation 
and other steps to return to and maintain financial st bility.69 This immediate political 
success might have prompted the countries to keep working together to achieve their 
goals within the financial system. But the aforementioned goals were commonly 
accepted. The 2010 IMF quota reforms can be regarded as another example of the 
BRIC´s agenda.70 However, the IMF quota reform is not yet approved.71 To what extent 
developments in the IMF will affect the BRICS´ goals nd agenda remains unclear. 
     The West is open to meeting the BRICS´ demands and the BRICS are working 
within the system.72 To point out that China is a major beneficiary of the current system 
leads to the conclusion that it seeks to fix deficin es from the inside.73 The BRICS 
were able to succeed within the current system and their incentives to maintain it should 
not be underestimated.74 These hypotheses may only be valid if the BRICS continue to 
benefit or else they might try to change the system. The BRICS don´t have an agenda 
for an alternative system.75  
     Having an agenda may require taking one step a a time and being confident. 
Focusing on global interdependence instead of a global power shift, the BRICS operate 
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well in the international field and are thus conceptualized as an “international regime”. 
This implies that they operate well within the current system. On the other hand, global 
interdependence is stressed. The BRICS occupy important positions in the global supply 
chain and international energy flows. Increased dependence by international powers on 
the BRICS emphasizes their importance. In addition, avoiding the BRICS becomes 
more difficult. The author Ünay Sadik furthermore emphasizes that current decisive 
power instruments in international global governance structures reflect interests of the 
old powers. The IMF governance structure supports this statement. Still, the BRICS are 
needed by its members to fulfill different purposes. Russia needs the BRICS for its own 
national self-esteem after the collapse of the Soviet Union and because its economy is 
extremely volatile being dependent on oil and gas prices. This example shows, the 
BRICS are countries with different political goals, different political systems and 
economies. Although involved in territorial disputes with one another, they still 
cooperate in international economic institutions such as the IMF.76 The disputes may 
harm cooperation significantly.  
     China enjoys a special position within the group of the BRICS. It can be assumed 
that China is the most influential actor in the Development Bank and thus in the 
BRICS.77 Regarded as the leader of the group China especially strives for a multilateral 
world order while seeking to take advantage of their integration into the global world 
order leading from behind.78 The country benefits among other things by stabilizing its 
international environment, maximizing leverage and hiding in a group to avoid negative 
attention.79 Negative attention might refer to preventive measure  taken by the US if 
China acts too aggressively. China like the other BRICS countries wants to give up as 
little decision-making authority as possible while gaining as many benefits as possible.80 
This means: shifting global governance within interational institutions such as the IMF 
to its advantage without losing benefits. Looking at other countries´ behaviors more 
closely, this surely represents the interests of all countries. China is no exception. One 
benefit it currently has is few responsibilities inthe international system. More 
responsibility may harm Chinese economy or lead to instability. But even if the BRICS 
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become more powerful, nothing in 2010 indicates today that they might try to overthrow 
the system.81 2010, the year of the reforms not yet approved, may trigger a turn in the 
BRICS´ foreign relations. 
     Some points are still important to keep in mind. The new order is defined as the 
reduction of influence established countries are able to exert those formerly on the 
peripheral and seeking consensus in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis in 
2008.82 The crisis of 2008 is not an adequate example for the situation was difficult and 
time pressures were high. As most Chinese businesses are global, global governance has 
become an important factor for China and companies want their government to take a 
more active role.83 Several Chinese scholars see the emerging countries in a phase of 
transition of influence in international decision-making.84  
China wants to play a more influential role and influences the BRICS to a great extent. 





2.6 The New Development Bank 
     The New Development Bank, “NDB” was established by the BRICS in 2014 to 
finance infrastructure projects in developing countries and BRICS´ countries.85 Its 
establishment and the role of the NDB are controversial. The Contingency Reserve 
Arrangements (CRA) also provides troubled countries in payment crises or currency 
depreciation problems with capital, a role similar to that of the IMF.86 The IMF advises 
developing countries and helps them financially. The NDB is completely separate from 
IMF operations. It compliments current institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IMF because it cannot challenge them.87  
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     The start-up capital for the Bank is 50 bn U.S. Dollars with the goal to reach 100 bn 
U.S. Dollars from contributions by all founding members. This bank was said to be the 
only “concrete action” taken by the BRICS who critiized the US for policies in 
Afghanistan but didn´t make alternative suggestions.88 But concrete was also the 
demand for reforms at the IMF. Maybe the Development Bank is the only formal 
institutional decision, one´s consequences we can gr sp, they committed themselves to. 
Still, the name “New Development Bank” might indicate where the BRICS are heading 
to; a new system?  
     One question is how powerful is the New Development Bank? The start-up capital is 
relatively small compared to the World Bank´s Funding. On the other hand Chinese 
banks have a more important financing role than the World Bank.89 This means the 
potential of the NDB in theory is much greater. Still the New Development Bank should 
cooperate with other institutions.90 The NDB is open to new members. For instance, UN 
members can join as borrowers or non-borrowing countries.91  
     An international group, the BRICS remains an “exclusive club”. The New 
Development Bank is an international institution addressed to everyone in the 
international community. Among those interested in jo ing at this point are Argentina, 
Indonesia and Mexico.92 The Bank´s headquarters are located in Shanghai. Tis fact 
already points to China´s leading position in the group as well as within the Bank. The 
Bank´s President and Vice President will be elected by one of the founding members. 
This would imply that members joining later may not have a significant voice on 
questions of great importance. The Bank´s governance framework would thus be 
designed to suit the will and needs of its founding members, foremost amongst them 
China.  However, the principle of equal voting rights is in stark contrast to the principles 
of quotas followed by the IMF. Equal voting rights don´t contribute to the feeling of a 
“Chinese dictatorship or dominance” unlike the US veto right in the IMF.93  
     The establishment of the New Development Bank is a significant step but should not 
be overrated. The Bank seems to be open to new members but may lack sufficient funds 
to evolve into an international player. In addition ts future development will depend on 
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the BRICS´ ability to cooperate. The Bank may pressure the IMF to agree on further 





3. Reforming the IMF before 2008  
     The IMF witnessed profound changes in its governance structure over the last 
decade. All-embracing governance reforms began in 2006 at the Singapore summit as 
members continued to discuss how developing countries could obtain more decision-
making power reflecting their relative position in the world economy.  In 2006 the first 
reforms were agreed on and approved by a majority of 90.6% of the voting power.94 
They were first proposed in 2003. The reforms required an 85% majority so US 
approval was indispensable. The report of the Executive Board and Resolution 
published outlined a detailed plan of reforms to be implemented within the subsequent 
years 2006-2008. The first part of reforms consisted of ad hoc quota increases for 
China, Turkey, Mexico and Korea. Considered for ad hoc increases were countries 
which were underrepresented under the current formula and whose increase would not 
predetermine discussions about a new quota formula. Quota reforms should have started 
after Singapore before the annual meeting in 2007. IMF members supported formulas 
placing a higher weight on factors like GDP and variability. A second round of ad hoc 
increases was planned based on the new formula for  wider set of countries. The 
realignment of quotas should reflect a country´s relative position in the world economy 
and should not be on a proportion of the existing quota. The plan outlined an increase of 
basic votes and the maintenance of a certain ratio of the basic votes to the country´s 
total votes. In addition, the selection of the managi g director should become more 
transparent and African countries should receive additional resources and help. These 
reforms present the common opinion of IMF members and were therefore ratified until 
2008. The Reforms were essential due to the insufficient representation of smaller or 
developing countries. Reflecting economic realities is the overall aim enhancing low-
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income countries´ votes because the IMF plays an important financial role for them. 
Additionally the report clarifies that all members will benefit from the changes.95 
     The importance of enhancing the institution´s credibility and cooperation among its 
members is emphasized. The Fund shall be strengthened so that all members may 
benefit.96 A possible legitimacy problem of the IMF is thus not mentioned explicitly 
even though most aspects of the problem are outlined.  
     Questions about the importance of the Fund and its ability to cope with a possible 
major future crisis were already raised by the media in 2007. “Many sitting on the huge 
reserves” e.g. China don´t want to be told what to do any longer. The feeling to be 
treated unfairly by the US and other wealthy countries is especially apparent in the case 
of the developing countries. Russia used the IMF crisis and chose a second candidate to 
that of Dominique Strauss Kahn, Josef Tosovsky who s uld represent the emerging 
economies.97 This candidature failed due to lacking support of he Czech government 
which supported the French candidate. Yet discussion  about the need for reforms 
remained. So, even though the first reform proposal didn´t mention the legitimacy crisis, 
it was already there and might have been one of the reasons to start reforms in the first 
place. The entire Fund and its role were called into question. The different publications 
show distinctively how the problem was perceived within the Fund and outside of it. 
The media however presented the problem far more critical.  
     Low-income countries were very dissatisfied and critical with the system. 
Questioned by low-income member states before 2008 was the voting system which 
should according to them value the equality of state  more than the resources a country 
contributes to the Fund.98 The reason might be a perceived inability for meaningful IMF 
governance on the side of the developing countries which creates a perception of 
systematic unfairness.99 This perception arises not only because of procedures within 
the IMF but other institutions as well. The IMF e.g. has always been headed by a 
European, whereas the World Bank has been run by an American. So at the forefront 
were nationalities and not economic capabilities nor qualification of the staff or the 
equality of states. While it is true that the IMF never had to adapt radically to changes, it 
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might on the other hand not be prepared today to adapt to new circumstances and the 
different realities and challenges in the 21st century.   
     Comparing Chinese claims with the outcomes of the reforms one can see a huge 
overlap. The reforms were said to be a triumph for China.100 They mainly contain 
Chinese proposals. An explanation might be that IMF reforms were discussed in 
connection with the rise of emerging economies especially China and Brazil and their 
right to more decision-making power.101 China had an average annual GDP growth of 
10.29% from 2000 to 2009; the highest growth was 14.2% in 2007.102 This remarkable 
economic success might have been the reason for othe countries to approach China. In 
2007 already countries like Venezuela turned to China to create a Bank of the South 
which would not be dominated by “the Empire” (the US).103 The establishment of a 
joint bank thus presented no new idea. The IMF grasped this tendency and reacted to it 
in 2005 already. The problem of underrepresentation of emerging and developing 
countries is addressed in 2005.104 One positive effect of this address or early awareness 
of the Fund was the reforms which were implemented st adily and immediately after 
pressure was growing.  
     The role emerging and developing countries have nd their contributions in global 
economic growth were stressed by China. Perceived as important economic actors by 
China and not by the IMF the developing countries might have felt valued by China. 
Discussions about IMF reforms are welcomed by China, but should be given higher 
priority. Developed countries are urged to show flexibility and foresight in this 
matter.105 The Chinese at this point might have already expected US resistance. They 
appeal for reforms and place themselves at the front of the developing countries at the 
same time. They might try to become the voice of all emerging countries and support 
their interests. China´s representative says the IMF should continue playing its role as 
the primary platform for global development financing.106 Increasing developing 
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countries´ say in decision-making is important in order for policies to reflect interests of 
all members.107 The call for reforms is welcomed but at the same ti  an appeal is made 
to speed up the process.108 In addition China wants the Fund to increase the basic quota 
to augment the voice of African countries in particular.109 Chinese calls were heard by 
the IMF.  
     Rodrigo de Rato Managing Director of the Fund explained the need to adapt to 
changes in a globalizing world with emerging economies in 2006.110 China reacted 
immediately to this statement to support reforms. In September 2006 China backed the 
proposed governance reform and addressed members to keep the “reform 
momentum”.111 The implementation of the two-year reform agenda was again backed in 
April 2007.112 The constant support and reminding of reform impleentation might 
indeed have resulted in other countries keeping the reform momentum. In addition 
China repeatedly emphasized its dedication to assist other developing countries in 
South-South cooperation.113 The Chinese focused on reforms from the beginning of the 
process supported by the Fund. The Managing Director explains in 2007 that it is 
important for the Fund´s members to be able to address the 21st century and that the 
Fund therefore needs to be attentive but is in disposition of sufficient financial resources 
to help.114 The legitimacy of the Fund is not connected with its role in the international 
economy. This is to change as one can see later after the financial crisis. What remains 
for China therefore is to address the problem of IMF to reflect the economic weight of a 
country properly.  
     In order to achieve this goal in October 2007 China further said that the overall ad 
hoc increase should be not less than 12.5% and should n t be solely considered under 
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liquidity aspects, the GDP should be given the greatest weight in the new formula. 
Subsequent efforts should be based on post-Singapore levels. One can see that the 
consideration of liquidity as a criterion is explicit y excluded by China. Furthermore 
China focused on the agreed goals and the timeframe of reforms. The idea was to build 
one reform on the other. The new formula should be based on the GDP, be transparent, 
simple and easy to implement and should include four variables: GDP, openness, 
variability and reserves. Variability should be given a higher weight than openness 
because it would reflect a member´s potential need for financial resources better. Basic 
votes should be increased to increase low-income countries´ votes and African 
Director´s offices resources and capacities should be increased. In order to be able to 
implement the reforms in the set time frame all countries should take a flexible and 
pragmatic approach.115 Again the attitude of member states as well as the content of the 
reforms is addressed. According to China the improvement of the Fund´s governance 
structure is vital to the participation and decision-making of developing countries in the 
institution.116 
     The years before the financial crisis the inter ational attention was on growing 
economic imbalances, China´s internal reforms and the support for developing or low-
income countries.117 In 2005 there were voices saying the IMF would be dead but Mr. 
Rodrigo de Rato explained that reforms are needed to change the way the IMF works.118 
The Fund cannot dictate but needs to persuade its members which it only is able when 
being legitimate gained through adequate representatio  of countries with growing 
economic importance especially in Asia.119 The Fund is therefore already aware of the 
needs to reform. 
     Between 2005 and 2008 the US supported IMF and Chinese claims. The US 
Department of Treasury admitted in 2005 that some developing countries´ quotas such 
as Turkey´s are lower than the IMF´s own calculations.120 Plus a country´s weight in the 
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economy is not reflected by the formulas in use. However, the Fund has enough 
liquidity and there is no need for a quota increase from that part.121 It seems that all 
participants confirm to reforms for the same reasons. The Fund does not need additional 
capital. The truth is the Fund possessed enough financ al resources to deal with the pre-
crisis every-day business. However, in 2008 it became pparent that the Fund has not 
enough liquidity to deal with the crisis. There should be a shift from over-represented 
countries to under-represented ones but without reducing the quota of the poorest 
countries. In addition the IMF Executive Board should better reflect membership. In 
spring 2007 generally the US agreed to reforms, however without stating exact figures 
and claims.122  
     In the period before the financial crisis refoms agreed on were mostly congruent to 
what China had suggested. The US agreed to those reforms because they were necessary 
and didn´t reduce US influence in the Fund significantly. Unlike the US China pushed 
members to ratify the reforms and to continue working on them. China had very specific 
ideas in mind. Other economic tendencies may have helped China to further pressure 
the IMF and the US. Swap deals can present one way to undermine US Dollar 
supremacy. US Dollar lending by the IMF declined from 70bn in 2003 to only 20bn in 
2006.123 The reason could be an increase in bilateral swap deals, big ones between 
China and the EU or China and the Bank of England took place in 2013.124 China 







     China´s tactics successful before the crisis remained the same between 2008 and 
2010. The crisis itself changed conditions in the ov rall economy and therefore also in 
the IMF. More reforms building on those already ratified were called for by China and 
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other emerging countries. Building on these reforms of 2006 another set of reforms was 
agreed on in 2008 and entered into force in 2011 (as scheduled). The reforms of 2008 
include a quota increase of 54 members, a tripling of basic votes, the establishment of a 
mechanism to keep a constant ratio of basic to total votes and enabling Executive 
Directors representing more than 7 countries to appoint a second alternative director.125 
In fact the reforms of 2008 complement established goals of 2006.  
     However, during and shortly after the financial crisis calls for reform became 
imperative. Unable to fulfill its role within the international financial system under these 
circumstances the IMF was confronted with a new reality. Therefore in 2008 the G20 
agreed to reforms in the IMF.126 After the financial crisis and due to pressure from the 
developing countries changes in the IMF were mostly decided during G-20 meetings 
such as the one in Pittsburgh in 2009 or the one in Toronto in 2010.127 China supported 
reforms, crisis response and rescue mechanisms and helped to support effective 
monitoring of financial institutions.128  
     Reforms of 2010 would if approved in the future build on reforms of 2008. The 
target date for completion was October 2012.129 The reforms include a doubling of the 
quota, a shift of 6% from overrepresented to underrepresented countries, shift more than 
6% to developing countries and emerging markets, realign quota shares (China 
becoming the third largest member) and preserve the voting share of the poorest 
countries.130 China would have the third largest quota after the US and Japan. The 
increase in quota leads to higher financial contribu ions of IMF members. Part of the 
difference is taken from the NAB to the quota so that not more money has to be spent. 
147 members having 77.24% of the voting power accepted the Amendment on 
reforming the Executive Board and 164 or 80.34% accepted the quota increase.131 The 
percentage of members agreeing to reforms is thus 78% and 87% respectively. Scholars 
however even question the 2010 reforms on the basis of restoring legitimacy and 
capacity in the IMF because they wouldn´t be sufficient.132 This means that further 
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reforms are necessary. But if reforms of 2010 are not ratified the chance get IMF 
approval for further reforms is low. 
     In the report of 2008 by the Executive Board to the Board of Governors enhancing 
the Fund´s legitimacy is emphasized.133 Dominique Strauss-Kahn said that he considers 
the global governance reform critical to strengthening the international monetary 
system. The title of his speech already suggests China´s leading role in reforming the 
IMF. So far my analysis supports this hypothesis since China repeatedly talks about the 
reform process and progress made. The Dollar he expcts to remain the principal 
reserve currency for some time to come.134 In November 2010 Dominique Strauss-Kahn 
said that the legitimacy problem had been solved, new changes will need new 
adaptations but for now they “catch up with the reality”. 135 This means that Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn in contrast to some experts believes the reforms of 2010 to be sufficient. 
China doesn´t share this view.  
 
“We stress that the quotas of under-represented members should 
be further adjusted in the next general quota review and a 
regular mechanism for quota adjustment established.” 136 
 
     In the beginning of 2008 China enhanced its relationship with the IMF by signing a 
Memorandum of Understanding.137 The overall support for reform is welcomed but 
reforms are criticized to fall short of the initial objectives of the Singapore 
Resolution.138 Further reforms would therefore be welcomed by the C inese.139 Again 
progress was appreciated but also steps to take pointed at.140 The role of the Bretton 
Woods institutions such as the IMF is of major importance for China.141 In September 
2009 the IMF signed a Note Purchase Agreement with China in order to have sufficient 
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financial resources available to assist emerging countries affected by the global 
financial crisis.142 A Note Purchase Agreements is a type of loan where the purchaser of 
the notes invests e.g. in a company and the seller raises money. This agreement reveals 
the problems addressed in 2007 about the Fund´s resources in case of a major crisis. The 
Fund cannot work properly without governance reform which before was denied. In 
fact, the crisis of 2008 made apparent the actual problem of not representing a country´s 
real share in the global economy.   
     China stressed that fundamental reforms are needed to discharge the mandate 
assigned again having specific ideas in mind. It isimportant that the Fund implements 
reforms announced by the G20, at least a 5% shift of qu ta shares in favor of emerging 
markets. China supports the increase of funds of the IMF in a variety of means but 
being a quota-based institution quota should be the primary resource. An automatic 
quota adjustment system should be introduced to avoid quota share misalignment. China 
calls for the approval of the 2008 reforms. They further support the broader reform of 
strengthening the Executive Board and a transparent, competitive merit-based process 
of management selection. Emerging countries should be represented more in 
management and staff. Further reforms are necessary to restore the international 
financial order.143    
     In 2009 China emphasized that the 14th General Quota Review be completed before 
January 2011.144 In 2010 this call was repeated, to be completed by the agreed deadline 
and that China is committed too, to protect the quota share of the poorest members. A 
100% Quota increase would be needed to keep the Fund a quota-based institution and 
the quota formula should be reviewed two years after th  completion of the 14th review. 
The effectiveness of the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) 
according to China first of all depends on its representation and not decision-making 
power.145 China further had expressed its willingness to deepen cooperation with the 
IMF on the “basis of mutual benefit” for sustainable global development in 2009.146  
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     Reforms of the international monetary system, establishing a super-sovereign 
international reserve currency, thereby reducing the world´s dependence on US Dollar 
was one goal proclaimed by the Chinese Central Bank Governor in 2009, but was not 
the official position of the Chinese government.147 This either shows how divided 
experts and politicians are on the subject or that t e Chinese government doesn´t play 
with open cards. Reforming the existing international system was necessary according 
to Dr Zhou Xiaochuan because the crisis had revealed th  vulnerabilities and systemic 
risks of the current international system.148   
     In 2010, Dominique Strauss-Kahn named Zhu Min special advisor to the managing 
Director.149 In the same year China called for a minimum quota shift of 5% to 
counteract the severe underrepresentation of the dev loping countries while protecting 
voting rights of the poorest countries at the same ti .150 The Fund working on a quota 
based system should be able to provide sufficient fu ding by that quota and not 
primarily through other means. To achieve this and to be able to provide the shift, not 
less than 100% increase in quota is proposed by China.151 Management staff should be 
more diverse and representative and the managing director should be selected on an 
open, transparent and merit-based system.152 
Meanwhile the IMF took other steps to help low-income countries. It IMF signed 
agreements with China, France, the UK and Japan to i crease loans for low-income 
countries.153 The IMF thus tried to ease pressure for reform supporting developing 
countries. China on the other hand called for reforms. The reform process has entered a 
critical stage in 2010 and if approved would set th foundation for broader governance 
reforms.154  
     Similar voices could be heard from the BRICs who in their joint statement of 2009 
feel committed to advancing reforms of international financial institutions to reflect 
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changes in the global economy. This is exactly what China claims as well and what the 
IMF has posed upon itself to do. The need for a more diversified international system is 
stressed with greater voice for developing and emerging countries. Heads of 
international institutions should be chosen through an open, transparent and merit-based 
system. This is the word choice China used in its speeches at the IMF. They want to 
serve emerging economies just like China said to do and underlined their support for a 
just multi-polar world.155 In the joint statement of 2010 most of the points were re-
highlighted and an appeal to the IMF formulated to address its legitimacy deficits or it 
might become obsolete. They expect the reform to be completed by the G20 summit in 
2010 and that the staff should better reflect the div rsity of membership. Agreed was 
further cooperation among their countries e.g. a meeting of their Development Banks.156 
At this stage already there might have been the idea to set up a joint Development Bank. 
The BRICS linked the willingness to provide more funds to the IMF to help countries 
recover with changes in voting shares. This could be perceived as blackmail.157  
     The US government was critical of the reforms of 2010 because it surpassed what 
had been agreed on earlier in 2009.158 US Congress had voted for making available 
more funding for IMF reforms mainly to tackle the global financial crisis.159 Still the 
government admitted that the IMF will become stronger and more credible due to this 
reform.160 The year 2010 marked the first divergence of opinin between U.S. Congress 
and the President.  
     In April 2009, “The Economist” noted that if the IMF is to succeed, it needs to 
reform. It even suggests cutting the majorities for decisions and ending the American 
veto.161  The media supports reforms. 
     Reforms of 2008 were agreed on and backed by US Congress and the President. 
Beginning in 2008 and in the years following the financial crisis China´s relationship 
with the IMF intensified and it took over more responsibility. Apart from that it also 
helped to solve immediate problems. Using the bargaining power of the BRICs China 
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pushed for further reforms which were agreed on in the IMF in 2010 but are still not in 
effect. Beginning with the reforms of 2010 a dispute between the President and the U.S. 





Post-2010  and the Establishment of the New Development Bank 
     The U.S. veto power continued to determine debates after 2010. Marked by growing 
impatience on the part of the international community the legitimacy crisis aggravated 
steadily. If the Quota reforms of 2010 reached the politically possible, there would be 
no chance for the IMF to restore its legitimacy. Other measures were taken to increase 
the IMF´s financial resources. In 2011 the NAB enlargement was activated giving the 
BRICS a veto power with a 16% share compared to supermajority decision making in 
IMF 85%. The NAB provides additional loans for countries in need of capital but they 
do not change decision-making power in the IMF. The NAB thus represents a 
compromise for more capital but doesn´t solve the problem of underrepresentation 
developing countries in the IMF. Ironically it doesn´t solve the liquidity problem either. 
The need for capital is huge. In 2014, the NDB and the Asian Infrastructure and 
Investment Bank (AIIB) were established. The AIIB is a China-led bank and should 
support infrastructure projects in Asian countries specifically.  
     China urged all members to ratify the 2010 reforms, which are a breakthrough and to 
continue with reforms e.g. the merit-based selection of management.162 The BRICS 
further point out that the nation-based selection undermines the Fund´s legitimacy and 
that emerging countries need to be sufficiently represented in the Fund´s 
management.163 The new Managing Director should be committed to the reforms and be 
able to adapt the institution to new realities.164 China added the IMF should promote 
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further reforms, put the ones of 2010 into effect and to make the quota formula simpler 
and more transparent.165  
     In 2011, China proposed steadily to push forward reform of the international 
monetary system, to expand the range of use of drawing rights, to restructure the 
composition of SDRs, and to establish a stable currency value.166 This is exactly what 
China did in the following years. Again in 2012 China urged the ratification of the 2010 
reforms by the agreed upon deadline and to complete th  review of the quota formula by 
January 2013.167 In April 2013 China again urged members to ratify the 2010 reforms 
not only to ensure legitimacy, effectiveness and credibility of the Fund but also to 
maintain global financial stability as the increase in quota is important.168 The quota 
formula reform should be completed by January 2014.169 A new formula should be 
agreed upon which better reflects each country´s current position in the economy and 
actual and calculated quotas shouldn´t be substantially different.170 By the end of 2013 
ratifying the 2010 reform had become “more urgent than ever”.171 By April 2014 China 
“deeply regrets” that the 15th General Review of Quotas had not been completed by 
January 2014 and the 2010 reforms were still not ratified.172  
 
“We remain committed to supporting the nature of the IMF as a 
quota-based institution and its role as an important contributor 
to the global financial safety net. We support the IMFC Chair’s 
call on the United States to approve both the 14th Review and 
the Board Reform Amendment as early as possible. We reaffirm 
our support for the completion of the 15th General Review of 
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Quota by January 2015, as soon as the 2010 reforms are 
implemented.”173 
 
     Only some months later this statement is emphasized again. In 2014 Yi Gang, 
alternative Governor of the People´s Republic of China said that IMF´s governance 
structure needs to be representative to be able to cope with the challenges ahead.174 He 
urged the US to take the next steps so that further reforms can be implemented. In 
addition, if the US doesn´t ratify the reforms by year-end (2014), the IMF is asked to 
act.175 He outlines additional reforms and improvements that have to be implemented 
and made.176 His words demonstrate Chinese interests in a functio ing IMF of which 
they are a part and their disappointment by US behavior. The speech addresses the US 
in particular and with unprecedented urgency.  
     Regarding the BRICS´ reports and statements similar ties can be observed. The tone 
is similar too and became increasingly serious. Important appeals are repeated in every 
document mentioned. The joint statement of the BRICS in 2011 called for an 
advancement of IMF reforms. Developing countries need to be adequately represented. 
In addition, discussions about the SDR currency basket were welcomed and a BRICS 
cooperation plan established.177 The appeals again equal those of China and are yet 
optimistic about the implementation of the 2010 refo ms. In 2012, the BRICS expressed 
concerns as to the slow pace of reforms. The head of the IMF should be elected through 
an open, merit-based system. The establishment of a New Development Bank was 
considered and an action plan created for experts to meet to discuss this NDB.178 The 
NDB may thus be an immediate reaction to slow reforms and to advance the BRICS´ 
interests which the IMF doesn´t do. In 2013, the BRICS agreed to establish the NDB 
again expressed concerns about the stalling of IMF reforms but expressed hopes to 
complete the next quota review by January 2014.179 The group became less optimistic 
about reforms but didn´t give up on changes. The Fortaleza Declaration picked on the 
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signs of the loss of legitimacy and effectiveness of international organizations. In that 
respect they declared themselves to be an important force. Still, they expressed their 
will to work within the international economic system although remaining to be 
disappointed and seriously concerned about the non-implementation of the 2010 IMF 
reforms. The IMF should develop options to move ahead with the IMF reforms. In case 
the reforms are not implemented by the end of 2010 the membership should reach a 
final agreement on a new formula with the 15th General Review not exceeding January 
2015.180 Even though the disappointment is high, the BRICS want to implement 
changes from inside the system.   
      The BRICS are convinced that the establishment of the New Development Bank is 
necessary in order to provide resources for developing and emerging economies.181 
Discussions about the Bank began in 2011.182 In fact, shortly after the IMF agreed on 
new reforms in 2010 perhaps prior to that, it was obvi us that it wouldn´t be ratified by 
the necessary number of countries. If this dominated BRICS´ actions, the only solution 
was to create institutions of their own. Without refo ms, the legitimacy of the IMF, as 
well as other institutions, is in question, because they don´t sufficiently represent the 
BRICS´ weight.183 Demanding the very same changes for years might reinfo ce the 
perception that they are not able or it is not possible under the current structures to gain 
fair voting shares in the IMF. Emerging economies hope that the NDB will challenge 
the existing institutions in fields such as emergency assistance.184 Those functions and 
financial needs mentioned remain unfulfilled by the IMF due to the lack of capital. 
Furthermore it has been suggested that the NDB, and when have developed, could in a 
few decades dwarf the World Bank loans.185 This would be a significant step towards 
replacing old institutions but depends on future developments. Chinese dominance an 
economy bigger than those of all other BRICS members combined, and disputes among 
                                                 
180 “The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration: July 15, 2014, Fortaleza, Brazil”, July 15, 2014, 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html (accessed 24.04.2015).  
181 “Agreement on the New Development Bank” Fortaleza, Br zil, (July 15, 2014), 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-bank.html (accessed 26.04.2015). 
182 Joseph Stiglitz interviewed by Amy Goodman “Nobel Economist Joseph Stiglitz Hails New BRICS Bank 
Challenging U.S.-Dominated World Bank and IMF” Democracy Now, (July 17, 2014), 
http://www.democracynow.org/2014/7/17/nobel_economist_joseph_stiglitz_hails_new (accessed 18.04.2015). 
183“2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement”, Brasilia, (April 15, 2010),  
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html, “Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration”, New Delhi, 
(March 29, 2012), http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html, “Media Note on the Informal 
Meeting of BRICS Leaders Ahead of the G20 Summit in St. Petersburg”, St. Petersburg, (September 5, 2013), 
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130905-note.html (accessed 18.04.2015). 
184 Raj M. Desai and James Raymond Vreeland “What the new bank of BRICS is all about”, Washington Post, (July 
17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-bank-of-brics-is-all-
about/ (accessed 20.04.2015). 
185 Ibid. 
   
40 
 
the BRICS make coordination in the NDB unlikely.186 Since 1952, Brazil gained 
experience with the help of its own Development Bank (BNDES) which can contribute 
to the New Development Bank.  The New Development Bank shows that the 
developing countries, despite their differences, can work together, often more 
successfully than some developed countries.187 This may alarm the US and its Western 
Allies. The BRICS and developing countries start to pr vide capital according to their 
needs.   
    The Development Bank of Latin America, CAF, funds more infrastructure projects in 
Latin America than the World Bank and American Development Bank combined.188 
The Chiang Mai Initiative was unable to implement a system of monitoring and 
surveillance which had to be done by the IMF so no Asian country has used the 
credit.189 The consequence might have been the establishment of the AIIB. Chinese 
scholars on the other hand praise the deepening cooperation and highlight the fact that 
the BRICS are taking increasingly the form of a political entity.190 The NDB has to be 
judged accordingly. China still feels the IMF is unfair and regards the BRICS as one of 
the most important multilateral organizations.191 The Chinese President emphasized the 
great benefits for all emerging and developing countries.192 China´s goal is a fairer 
world, not challenging any specific power.193 The BRICS countries believe that the 
NDB, despite Western concerns, will play a complementary role.194 Mutual benefits as 
well as the need for a strong partnership between th  NDB and the World Bank are 
stressed.195 
     The lack of commonality might be an economic asset since cooperation benefits all 
members reducing competitive thinking.196 Advancing national interests might be the 
primary goal of the BRICS.197 The BRICS failed to agree on a common candidate for 
the IMF in 2011-2012.198 This example shows that sometimes disagreements within the 
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group can lead to setbacks because not enough leverage can be generated by only a part 
of the group.  
     After the announcement of the New Development Bank the thinking in the BRICS 
shifted. The BRICS now will challenge US and Western supremacy and the institutions 
established by them.199 Unlike the World Bank the NDB would not challenge countries´ 
sovereignty their loan requirements are fewer.200  Oliver Stuenkel explains that the NDB 
is a reaction to the stagnating economic situation of the BRICS and the bank is an effort 
to survive.201 The Economist does not judge the NDB as a threat to the current 
international system, at least not at the present. The NDB joins a number of already 
existing development banks like the BNDES. But it may have more money at its 
disposal if Brazil and India were as skeptical about Chinese intentions and power as 
they are about the West´s. The differences might result in disputes as to whom to lend 
money.202 The objective of the Bank according to the Brazilin Minister of 
Development, foreign industry and trade will not rival any existing institution but 
strengthen cooperation among the BRICS and offer new financing possibilities.203 
Looking at its objectives and financial scope this statement is true. Xi Jinping says that 
the NDB will bring more democracy and balance to the economy and international 
relationships.204 Democracy here could mean stability of the internatio l financial 
system or fairer chances for developing countries. It certainly does not refer to the 
meaning of democracy a Western person would understand i .  
     The goals include a more balanced and integratd global capitalism, an example was 
China´s proposal of a new world currency to replace the dollar or the Renminbi during 
the 2008 collapse.205 This idea might be promoted, again if China benefits from it. If it 
actually wanted a more integrated and balanced system why manipulate its own 
currency?  
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     The U.S. Congress refused to ratify the proposal which would increase China´s 
voting share in the IMF from 3.8 in 2008 to 6.07 in 2011. Without the US´ cooperation 
China cannot achieve its goals. In addition, it highlights the extraordinary position of 
the US within the IMF. Chinese leadership might become suspicious about the West´s 
true intentions for reforms.206  
     In 2013, Obama tried to get authorization from Congress to implement the 
reforms.207 Concerns of Congressmen about US credibility were raised if delays 
continued.208 Even though little additional money would be spent, more US taxpayer 
money would be available for loans but the US would have no veto to decide who gets 
the money.209 This is because quotas are increased by 100% and the contributions 
increase as well. The US is the largest contributor to the NAB and can block loans if 
they wish to.210 The Obama Administration included the IMF reforms of 2010 in the 
budget requests FY2014 and FY2015.211 Congress published an informational paper on 
the impacts on the U.S. of the IMF reforms of 2010 in March 2014. This document 
confirms that emerging economies are insufficiently reflected in their representation in 
the IMF and the size of IMF´s resources is too low. It also stressed that US veto power 
would not be touched by the changes in the IMF. Congressional approval of the changes 
in the IMF is necessary to change the IMF quota system. The needed funds were not 
requested by the Administration. Considering that te changes were agreed on in 2010 
and neither Congress nor the President has taken actio s needed for enactment reveals a 
considerable road block of the US. As possible consequences for the US are not 
negative, financial commitment would not increase,212 and representation would not be 
affected significantly.213 This reaction to agreed changes in the IMF shows that the US 
chooses to play the veto card. In addition, it reflects the considerable amount of power 
of Congress on the implementation of decisions in international bodies. Even though the 
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US veto power wouldn´t be lost, four BRICS members would be among the ten largest 
shareholders. This might impact decisions for which less approval is needed so the 
BRICS might be able make decisions with the help of only a few other countries against 
the interests of the US and/ or Europe. The main reason for the delay is domestic 
politics in the US.214 This argument seems valid since other countries which are also 
affected by the quota change have ratified it. The behavior of the Administration is all 
the more confusing since they once pressured the Europeans to find a solution or else 
allow 20 member states go bankrupt.215  
     Scholars such as Lesage agree that the reform of 2010 corresponds to US interests.216 
If he is right, Chinese and U.S. interests would be similar or actually the same in this 
case. They might share more than currently visible. This would make the attitude of 
Congress even less understandable. The only attempt to pass the bill was by using it as 
an Amendment to an unrelated bill about Ukraine but the Amendment was withdrawn 
again and the Republicans blamed for that.217 Ms Lagarde, the Managing Director of the 
IMF said that she is disappointed that US Congress didn´t take the necessary steps.218   
Nobel-Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz points out:  
 
“(… ) It reflects a fundamental change in global economic and 
political power, that one of the ideas behind this is that 
the BRICS countries today are richer than the advanced 
countries were when the World Bank and the IMF were founded. 
We’re in a different world. “219  
 
 
     The media is on China´s side. The Washington Post highlights how China and other 
developing countries have waited impatiently in recent years for the US to approve the 
IMF reforms of 2010. China has contributed more capital to the Fund than necessary for 
years in order to gain more decision-making power. Edwin M. Truman, senior fellow at 
the Peterson Institute for International Economics, says that the world was patient only 
until realizing that the Republican Congress will continue to block the reforms. Obama 
is not pushing hard enough for reforms and the politica  climate is acid. The US is 
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losing reputation.220 The article published four month later explains the establishment of 
the NDB based on the aforementioned criticism of the institutions. The BRICS are tired 
of waiting. Even though Ms Lagarde called for patienc , understanding on the side of 
the authors is promoted for the decision to act now.221 The unfair distribution of quota is 
also mentioned in The Financial Times which also emphasizes that the NDB is too 
small to make significant changes.222  
     The Telegraph highlights the threat the NDB poses to US dollar supremacy. In 
combination with swop deals and Russian-Chinese contracts whose yuan-rouble basis 
remains unclear, US dollar dominance will be threatened.223 
     Jim O´Neill said in 2013 that he sees even more potential for the BRICS and they 
should start to establish institutions in order to become more than a non-binding 
group.224 The Russian media exaggerated on the significance of the NDB. They say the 
NDB would be the new IMF and that the BRICS are establishing a new system 
replacing the old institutions such as the World Bank.225 
     Others say the BRICS are stuck within the system and don´t have the ability yet to 
change the system.226 
The BRICS have huge capital resources which are needed in the developing world. 
China wants to invest its resources in different investments than US treasury bills which 
are losing value. According to Stiglitz the developing countries in need of several 
trillions of dollars of which the current institutions can only provide 2-4%.227 The NDB 
could fill the gap the IMF left and adapt to new circumstances. The IMF thus might be 
forced to reform. The tone and words used by the BRICS are similar to those used by 
China.  
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Most recent developments 2015 
     In order to be able to put the NDB and China´s behavior into context, the analysis 
has to include the most recent developments of 2015. These developments show how 
quickly changes may occur.  
     March: Founded by China in October 2014 the “Asian Infrastructure and Investment 
Bank” (AIIB) consists of 27 founding members. In March 2015, the UK was the first 
Western power to join the Bank followed by France and Germany. These developments 
received a lot of attention in the media because they pose another challenge to the US-
dominated system. The AIIB is a Chinese founded bank of which the US is not (yet) a 
member. The Chinese Minister of Finance Lou Jiwei explained the AIIB would not 
compete against the IMF but complement it.228 Welcoming the establishment of the 
AIIB Christine Lagarde illustrated that the IMF´s portfolio doesn´t include the financing 
of infrastructure projects and that neither institution would compete with the other.229 
However, the AIIB will be the first international financial institution with Western 
member countries under the leadership of China. In co trast to the NDB, the AIIB 
shows how strong Chinese pull factors and leadership have become. In addition the 
establishment of the AIIB might signal that China doesn´t place too much importance 
on the NDB. 
     In addition, domestic pressure on the US Congress to authorize reforms increases. 
According to US Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, denying approval to the reforms of 2010 
was dangerous because the US lacks leverage on the AIIB. 230 As long as the IMF 2010 
reforms are not approved, the legitimacy problem will become increasingly destructive 
to the IMF´s operations and credibility diluting the institution from within. Its members 
feel the need to join the AIIB to deal with new challenges. Even though IMF operations 
don´t collide with that of the AIIB, the AIIB´s success points at the deficiencies of the 
current system. If those deficiencies become larger in the future because the legitimacy 
problem remains, they might be taken up by the AIIB or other international institutions 
as well. The IMF is at risk of becoming redundant.   
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     April: The Chinese economy is growing slowly in 2015.231 China grows at a pace 
which might be insufficient to pressure the US for reforms. But the accumulated capital 
and established networks will ensure investments and further bargaining.  
     The Chinese Central Bank Governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, announced plans for 
currency reforms in order to add the Yuan to the IMF currency basket, the Special 
Drawing Rights basket.232 US officials objected immediately saying that the Yuan is not 
yet ready to join.233 It is however unclear how to decide this question. A y change in 
SDR would come into effect in January 2016 but it is yet unclear whether a 70% or 85% 
supermajority vote will be needed.234 If this inclusion has to be decided by an 85% 
majority the US can use its veto power to stop China from pursuing this goal. Those 
attempts show the way in which China tries to undermine US supremacy while trying at 
the same time to integrate into the international financial system. Recognizing the 
importance of the IMF China continues to invest in it and to support it. Depending on 
the decision of how to decide the issue one can easily conclude about the amount and 
way of U.S. dominance in the Fund. The decision of pr cedure might as well already 
decide whether China´s currency will be included in the basket or not. 
     Voices became harsh. In April 2015, China accused the US of “undermining” the 
IMF´s legitimacy by not ratifying the reforms of 201 . “(…) any interim step should 
represent a meaningful advance to the goals of the 2010 reform without substituting for 
the reform itself.” The review of the quota formula and the 15th General Review of 
Quotas should be completed by the set deadline December 15th 2015.235 Becoming 
impatient, China exerts pressure on the US. 
     In April 2015, Congress published another paper on IMF reforms. The Obama 
Administration included IMF reforms 2010 in its budget request of 2016 again.236 In the 
“Adequacy of IMF Resources” a more detailed account of the lack of financial 
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resources in the IMF is given compared to 2014.237 The intention may be to point at 






     China is an integral part of the international community and acts within the 
international system. By providing significant support to the IMF to fulfill its role, 
China accepted more responsibilities in the IMF. In return, China claimed a higher 
Quota for itself and other emerging economies. In the early 21st century the rise of 
China and other emerging countries culminated in important and major IMF reforms. 
These reforms should ensure the Fund´s legitimacy. 
     The analysis of the last decade in the IMF therefore shows that China does not 
challenge the international system. This confirms the hypothesis. It is true that China 
tries, within the international framework dominated by the US, to gain more power in 
the IMF. China, still trying to gain more power, uses the legitimacy problem of the 
Fund.  
     If the IMF doesn´t regain control of its legitimacy problem, Chinese dominated 
institutions will continue to take more responsibilities and might eventually undermine 
US supremacy. We might as well head towards a condominium of power even if that 
state may be reached by China forcing the US on concessions in the medium to long-
term. IMF credibility problems have been aggravated in the last decade. Whereas in the 
beginning, talk was about more decision-making power for low-income countries and 
the role of the IMF in the world, today the situation has turned into a severe crisis and a 
legitimacy problem so that future of the entire institution is called into question. The 
examples of the NDB and AIIB show that China is alre dy “filling the gaps.” 
Furthermore, there are no reasons given by the US why approval of reforms was 
delayed. Trying to avoid the reforms appears to be pointless. Though the IMF has not 
yet experienced significant changes in governance ad governance structure, it needs to 
                                                 
237 Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss “IMF Reforms: Is ues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 
(March 11, 2014), pp.2-4,  
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implement the reforms. Supporting the reforms, China wants more decision-making 
power but is reluctant, at the same time, to take over more responsibility.   
     Therefore, the goal of the establishment of the Development is to put pressure on the 
US to ratify the 2010 IMF reforms. While complementing the IMF in parts, the New 
Development Bank highlights IMF deficiencies. Once a new network is established it is 
easier for institutions to take more responsibilities. Whether or not the taking over of 
more responsibilities seems likely will depend on hw China is treated in the IMF. 
     China´s behavior within and outside the IMF reflects to a great extent its treatment 
by major powers and decision-makers. In the last deca  major reforms were passed, 
the only IMF reform which has not yet been approved is the 2010 reforms. China tried 
to pressure the US constantly in speeches, reminding the international community to 
ratifying important decisions taken by the community. China realized that its power 
alone is too small and China thus found a new group, the BRICS. Although, the BRICS 
met the first time in 2008, it was only two years after the 2010 reforms were still not 
passed that they agreed to create a joint Development Bank. Then China established the 
AIIB in 2014. Thus China learnt that when needed by the international system, the West 
is prepared to make concessions.  
     We can further conclude that for various reasons i.e., lack of implementing working 
operating procedures, amount of capital for use…etc. the NDB and AIIB are not yet 
able to challenge the system. But China is using the niches available to build its own 
network, beginning with the BRICS Forum, followed by the NDB and AIIB.     
     Comparing US reaction to the NDB and AIIB demonstrates that the AIIB is a much 
greater threat to US dominance than the NDB. Another lin  has been crossed in the last 
months. The UK which enjoyed a “special friendship” with the US has decided to join 
the Bank. It seems that Chinese pull factors become mor  and more attractive so that not 
only the US but also its allies turn to Asia.  
     Altogether China is pursuing a two-way strategy. It doesn´t challenge the IMF, but 
contributes financially. China doesn´t have the power to change the IMF from within. It 
supplements the IMF by establishing the NDB and the AIIB. Those banks, may gain 
opportunities to challenge the IMF in the future. Development Banks like the ones in 
Brazil or Latin America have existed for decades and no one questioned their role 
challenging the IMF as is done in the case of the NDB.  
     The BRICS were said to challenge US supremacy but questions about their ability to 
work together exist, which is regarded as one reason why they might not be able to 
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challenge the US. Today we have to reject these early assumptions and say that the 
RICS are well aware of their chances and able to use them.  
     Future research thus has to closely look at the way the IMF and Chinese dominated 
institutions are heading and how they develop. China is neither a status-quo power nor 
challenger per se. It is necessary to continue to analyze global economic developments 
and to consider other global institutions i.e., The World Bank. The conclusions drawn 
from this analysis suggest that findings within other international organizations might 
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Summary of the thesis 
 
     The aim of this thesis is to find out whether China today acts within the 
international order analyzing its behavior in the IMF. China´s history reveals 
the importance of leaders and the oscillations of their worldview and outlook. 
Each period in time has to be looked at specifically. Upon that the History and 
power structure of the IMF are explained resulting i  the conclusion that for 
China to gain more decision-making power foremost the increase of Quota is 
important. Reforms in governance on the other hand are not a regular part of 
the IMF´s history which was rather stable. The same stability shows the IMF-
Chinese relations which reveal how well China integrated into the IMF acting 
more like a developed than a developing country. Whereas in the beginning 
China had to rely on the IMF for advice today their knowledge about the 
financial system has increased considerably. The BRICS are presented as a 
new phenomenon with difficulties due to their differences. Acting as a group, 
intergovernmental, non-binding decisions are made. Their NDB presents a 
project that is complementary to existing institutions financing infrastructure 
projects in developing countries.  
 
     The analysis consists of four parts and focus on Chinese claims for reforms, 
the actual reforms made and reactions of the interna io al community 
especially the United States. Articles, speeches, interviews and reports reflect 
that the legitimacy problem of the IMF started in 2005 already. The IMF itself 
was unaware of its lack of financial resources in case of a crisis. In 2006 
reforms were primarily agreed on to strengthen the developing and low-income 
countries´ voices in the Fund. This changed after 2008 when the second packet 
of reforms was ratified. Soon in 2010 the Executive Board agreed on further 
reforms which are not passed to this day because the US uses its veto. 
Officially the US doesn´t want to lose control over taxpayers´ money which 
would be shifted from the NAB to the Quota. In the NAB the US has a veto 
and could thus decide who would get the money and who not.  
 
     Generally the analysis shows that China tries o gain more power in the IMF 
staying within the international system. Yet it establishes new complementary 
organizations when the process of implementation is slowed down. Those 
complementary organizations might challenge existing o es in the future which 
today seems unlikely. The IMF will have to get its legitimacy problem under 
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